# **A** Algorithms

### A.1 Training the ITE model

In Algorithm 1 we give a detailed overview of how our ITE model (Section 4) is trained. There are two main blocks: first the organ clusters are trained; then, we train our ITE model using backpropagation. The GRL allows us to compartmentalise the gradient updates in three distinct updates: one for the outcome prediction parameters,  $\theta_Y$ ; one for the treatment classification parameters,  $\theta_c$ , based on the organ clusters trained in the first block; and one for the representation parameters,  $\theta_{\Phi}$ , where the previous losses are combined as in (5). Of course, these three distinct updates are equal to one update over  $\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}_{\text{TE}}(\theta_{\Phi}, \theta_Y, \theta_p)}{\partial \theta_{\Phi} \partial \theta_Y \partial \theta_p}$ , instead, but found this to abstract away to much detail at the expense of understanding. (47)

### Algorithm 1: Training our ITE model.

### A.2 Organ-to-patient assignment results

We describe how we evaluate the organ-to-patient assignment policies on real data in Algorithm 2. Should a patient-organ pair be present as-is in the test set, we base the score on the factual outcome, otherwise we use a counterfactual model to provide an outcome. Furthermore, after every organ assignment, we check whether the other patients have died while in  $\mathcal{X}_{Q}$ .

```
Input :data, \mathcal{D} = \{ (\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{o}_i, y_i) : i = 1, ..., N \}
               test data, \mathcal{D}_{test} \subset \mathcal{D}
               counterfactual model, \hat{Y}
               to-evaluate policy, \pi
for t = 0, 1, ..., |\mathcal{D}_{test}| do

\mathcal{X}_Q^t \leftarrow \mathcal{X}_Q^{t-1} \cup \{\mathbf{X}^t\} \in \mathcal{D}_{test};
      \mathbf{o} \leftarrow \mathbf{O}^t \in \mathcal{D}_{\text{test}};
      if \mathbf{o} \neq \emptyset then
            \mathbf{x} \leftarrow \pi(\mathbf{o});
            if (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{o}) \in \mathcal{D}_{test} then
              | \text{ score} \leftarrow \text{ score} + \mathcal{D}_{\text{test}}(Y | \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{O});  // Patient-organ is in test-set
            else
                	ext{score} \leftarrow 	ext{score} + \hat{Y}(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{O});  // Patient-organ pair not in test-set
            end
      end
      for all \mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}_Q^t do
            if x died in \mathcal{X}_O^t then
                   if x did not receive an organ in \mathcal{D}_{test} then
                    | score \leftarrow score + \mathcal{D}_{\text{test}}(Y|\mathbf{X}); // Patient-organ is in test-set
                   else
                    \Big| score \leftarrow score + \, \hat{Y}(\mathbf{X}) \;; // Patient-organ pair not in test-set
                   end
            end
      end
```

end

Algorithm 2: Evaluation of a policy,  $\pi$ .  $\hat{Y}$  is trained using  $\mathcal{D}_{\text{train}}$ , where  $\mathcal{D}_{\text{test}} \cup \mathcal{D}_{\text{train}} = \mathcal{D}$  and  $\mathcal{D}_{\text{test}} \cap \mathcal{D}_{\text{train}} = \emptyset.$ 

#### **Benchmarks and ablations: details** B

### B.1 ITE model

We compare our ITE model with ConfidentMatch, and a multitask network which predicts the outcome per organ-type (based on the organ clusters,  $c(\mathbf{O})$ ).

**ConfidentMatch [10, 28].** ConfidentMatch is an ensemble prediction method where the trainingdata is divided in partitions and a predictor method is fitted on every partition. Given an hypothesis space (i.e., prediction methods of a certain VC-dimension), and a maximum partition count, ConfidentMatch optimises a prediction loss over different compositions of the partitions and combinations of predictors from the hypothesis space.

We set the maximum partition count to the number of organ-clusters we used when comparing to our ITE model. For example, when we fit our KM eans cluster with k = 15, we restrict ConfidentMatch's partition count to 15. Furthermore, we set the hypothesis space to a RandomForestRegressor, support vector machine for regression (SVR), and a multi-layered perceptrion (MLP) [63].

**Multi-task network.** Given the organ-clusters,  $c(\mathbf{O})$ , we train a multi-task network to predict outcomes for every organ-cluster. Specifically, we employ a hard-parameter sharing methodology for our mutli-task network. As we have only one factual outcome for every patient, we set the counterfactuals (i.e. the other organ-clusters) to the prediction when computing the loss. As such,



Figure 5: Networks used in the ablation study.

the loss for the counterfactuals remains 0, such that the gradient update is only based on the factual outcome.

### **B.2** Ablation study networks

As we have in Figure 3, we illustrate the architectures for the ablation studies of our ITE model in Figure 5

### **B.3** Organ-to-patient assignment policy benchmarks

Best match (BM)  $-\pi_{BM}(\mathcal{X}_Q, \mathbf{O}) \coloneqq \operatorname{argmax}_{\mathbf{X} \in \mathcal{X}_Q} \{Y^{\mathbf{O}} | \mathbf{X}\}$ A common organ-to-patient assignment policy, selecting whomever is associated with highest life expectancy, given the available organ. We use the same policy for ConfidentMatch, but let  $\hat{Y}$  be estimated as in Yoon et al. [10].

First in first out (FIFO)  $-\pi_{\text{FIFO}}(\mathcal{X}_Q, \mathbf{O}) \coloneqq \operatorname{argmin}_{\mathbf{X} \in \mathcal{X}_Q} \{s_{\mathbf{X}}\}$ 

FIFO is a naive scheduling algorithm that simply selects the oldest addition to the queue, based on  $s_{\mathbf{X}}$  representing the time of entry, whenever an organ becomes available.

# Sickest person first (SPF) $-\pi_{\text{SPF}}(\mathcal{X}_Q, \mathbf{O}) \coloneqq \operatorname{argmin}_{\mathbf{X} \in \mathcal{X}_Q} \{ Y^{\emptyset} | \mathbf{X} \}$

Like FIFO, we relate SPF to common queueing strategies, where SPF relates to a prioritised queue. While a measure of sickness is not directly observable, we can approximate it with a patient's estimated life expectancy,  $\hat{Y}^{\emptyset}$ . That is, a patient with lower life expectancy is considered sicker than a patient with higher life expectancy.

# Incremental survival (IS) $-\pi_{IS}(\mathcal{X}_Q, \mathbf{O}) \coloneqq \operatorname{argmax}_{\mathbf{X} \in \mathcal{X}_Q} \{ Y^{\mathbf{O}} - Y^{\emptyset} | \mathbf{X} \}$

Currently employed as policy in the UK, is an estimate of incremental survival rates for an individual patient [9]. In effect, this is a first step towards a counterfactual based approach, though it should be noted that in Neuberger et al. [9], assignment bias was not balanced from the dataset.

## C Additional results

### C.1 Organ-to-patient assignment

We present a detailed breakdown of the results for our organ-to-patient assignment policy. Specifically, we report: (i) the premature deaths in  $\mathcal{X}_Q$  and  $\mathcal{X}_M$ — where any death in  $\mathcal{X}_Q$  and any death before 5 years in  $\mathcal{X}_M$  is considered premature; and (ii) the average time alive in  $\mathcal{X}_Q$  and  $\mathcal{X}_M$ — where patients in  $\mathcal{X}_M$  are not considered for the average time alive in  $\mathcal{X}_Q$ .

While these results are informative on the performance of all policies, they require careful attention. For example, a high life expectancy in  $\mathcal{X}_Q$  is not necessarily a good property of a policy, as this means that potentially healthier patients are dying before they receive a transplant-organ. Similarly for deathrates in  $\mathcal{X}_Q$ , where a low deathrate in  $\mathcal{X}_Q$  could indicate a waste of transplant-organs as the policy might prefer sicker patients, with lower life expectancy in  $\mathcal{X}_M$ .

As mentioned in our related works (Section 2), deciding the objective brings forth an ethical discussion and should be done with great care. By reporting these details, we offer argumentation for clinicians interested in implementing a policy for scarce medical resources. While OrganITE is clearly the best policy when optimising the total population life years (as was our objective, cfr. Section 3), some situations might favor SPF as it allows sicker patients to be treated first. An example of such a situation could be pain relief, where patients suffering the most are aided first.

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FIFO	SPF	BM	IS	СМ	OrganITE		
83509	92153	104889	111228	110129	112359		
0.2646	0.2309	0.2357	0.2067	0.2038	0.1926		
0.1683	0.1869	0.1702	0.1593	0.1891	0.1472		
32.49	32.38	32.81	32.65	33.12	37.19		
4.347	4.138	5.088	5.057	5.165	5.905		
n.a.	71953	86664	81813	n.a.	106392		
n.a.	0.1587	0.2179	0.3201	n.a.	0.3346		
n.a.	0.3201	0.3152	0.3048	n.a.	0.3055		
n.a.	24.46	11.55	20.52	n.a.	31.50		
n.a.	4.222	5.181	4.572	n.a.	5.785		
	FIFO 83509 0.2646 0.1683 32.49 4.347 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.	FIFO         SPF           83509         92153           0.2646         0.2309           0.1683         0.1869           32.49         32.38           4.347         4.138           n.a.         71953           n.a.         0.3201           n.a.         24.46           n.a.         4.222	FIFO         SPF         BM           83509         92153         104889           0.2646         0.2309         0.2357           0.1683         0.1869         0.1702           32.49         32.38         32.81           4.347         4.138         5.088           n.a.         71953         86664           n.a.         0.3201         0.3152           n.a.         24.46         11.55           n.a.         4.222         5.181	FIFO         SPF         BM         IS           83509         92153         104889         111228           0.2646         0.2309         0.2357         0.2067           0.1683         0.1869         0.1702         0.1593           32.49         32.38         32.81         32.65           4.347         4.138         5.088         5.057           n.a.         71953         86664         81813           n.a.         0.3201         0.3152         0.3048           n.a.         24.46         11.55         20.52           n.a.         4.222         5.181         4.572	FIFO         SPF         BM         IS         CM           83509         92153         104889         111228         110129           0.2646         0.2309         0.2357         0.2067         0.2038           0.1683         0.1869         0.1702         0.1593         0.1891           32.49         32.38         32.81         32.65         33.12           4.347         4.138         5.088         5.057         5.165           n.a.         71953         86664         81813         n.a.           n.a.         0.1587         0.2179         0.3201         n.a.           n.a.         0.3201         0.3152         0.3048         n.a.           n.a.         24.46         11.55         20.52         n.a.           n.a.         4.222         5.181         4.572         n.a.		

Table 4: Organ-to-patient evaluation on synthetic data over 10 different folds. Lower is better above the dotted line, and higher is better below the dotted line.

**Results on synthetic data.** In Table 4 we report a detailed breakdown of the results presented in the upper part of Table 3 in our main text. From this we learn that OrganITE's performance is better across all reported metrics when using our ITE model. However, when using TransplantBenefit we notice weaker performance in death rates, especially in  $\mathcal{X}_Q$ . This small performance drop is made up for by a significant increase in expected life years after transplantation.

**Results on real data.** We argue that OrganITE's performance is a result of balancing the various aspects taken into account in organ-to-patient assignment (cfr. Section 4.1). Leveraging this balance results in less deaths and high life expectancy, making OrganITE such a successful assignment-policy.

This balance is visible in Table 5, where we find OrganITE to excel in life expectancy posttransplantation, while maintaining decent performance in the other performance indicators. For example, notice how OrganITE is best in life expectancy post-transplantion across all counterfactual models, while performing: best or second best in premature deaths in  $\mathcal{X}_M$ ; never worst in death rates for  $\mathcal{X}_Q$  (even second best for TB as the counterfactual model); and never worst in life expectancy in  $\mathcal{X}_Q$  (third using TB as the counterfactual model).

Furthermore, notice how SPF has higher life expectancy and lower death rates in  $\mathcal{X}_Q$ , while performing very poorly in total population life years. SPF's performance is due to the aforementioned greedy approach to selecting the sickest patients in the waiting queue,  $\mathcal{X}_Q$ .

, e					
Nearest neighbor counterfactual	FIFO	SPF	BM	IS	OrganITE
Population life years	94062	83198	100249	102303	108217
Deaths in $\mathcal{X}_Q$	0.4414	0.4055	0.4209	0.4236	0.4233
Deaths before 5 years in $\mathcal{X}_M$	0.2196	0.2422	0.2093	0.1972	0.1787
Avg. days alive in $\mathcal{X}_Q$	28.78	28.96	27.83	28.12	28.15
Avg. years alive in $\mathcal{X}_M$	3.805	3.363	4.057	4.138	4.378
ITE model counterfactual					
Population life years	95646	84757	92948	105866	107623
Deaths in $\mathcal{X}_Q$	0.4294	0.4081	0.4189	0.4245	0.4257
Deaths before 5 years in $\mathcal{X}_M$	0.1995	0.2455	0.1996	0.1794	0.1806
Avg. days alive in $\mathcal{X}_Q$	28.70	28.96	28.33	28.13	28.05
Avg. years alive in $\mathcal{X}_M$	3.875	3.436	3.765	4.282	4.349
TB counterfactual					
Population life years	89979	83347	99259	101585	102773
Deaths in $\mathcal{X}_Q$	0.4294	0.4041	0.4277	0.4167	0.4113
Deaths before 5 years in $\mathcal{X}_M$	0.2195	0.2653	0.2296	0.1994	0.1906
Avg. days alive in $\mathcal{X}_Q$	27.21	28.83	22.34	25.48	26.77
Avg. years alive in $\mathcal{X}_M$	3.676	3.348	4.008	4.109	4.153

Table 5: Organ-to-patient evaluation on real data over 10 different folds. Lower is better above the dotted line, and higher is better below the dotted line.



Figure 6: Policy performance indicators in function of temperature,  $\tau$ , as in (7). From left to right: Deaths in  $\mathcal{X}_Q$ , Deaths in  $\mathcal{X}_M$ , Days alive in  $\mathcal{X}_Q$ , and Years alive in  $\mathcal{X}_M$ . For deaths, lower is better; for time alive, higher is better.

### C.2 Density importance

Adjusting the density  $p(\mathbf{O})$  in the synthetic experiment (Table 4) allows us to report on how important this density is to OrganITE and other organ-assignment policies, in terms of the performance metrics presented above. From Figure 4 we learn that OrganITE's expected total population life years seems much less affected by more extreme organ-densities, when compared to the other organ-to-patient assignment policies. Here, we report the same breakdown of our result as we have above, providing a more detailed argument for the organ-to-patient assignment policies.

What is a more extreme density? First, we clarify that by introducing a temperature parameter, we make some organs more rare than other organs. Specifically, because the weights, w, in (7) sum to one ( $\sum w = 1$  making  $0 \le w_i \le 1 \forall w_i$ ), and every component of w is divided by  $\tau \in (0, 1]$ , we make some organ clusters less likely or more likely. As such, leaving patients in need of otherwise more frequent organs (as they are present in  $\mathcal{D}$ ), now less likely to receive a suitable organ.

Why is this important? Having more patients in need of rare organs, requires a policy to explicitly handle these deficits in a way that gives higher priority to these patients, at the cost of potentially multiple better matches with the available organ. From this experiment it is clear that using an estimate of  $p(\mathbf{O})$  allows OrganITE to make more informed decisions on how to distribute organs in such an extreme condition.

**Results.** Consider Figure 6 where we breakdown the result presented in Figure 4 as we did for the results above. From this breakdown we notice that OrganITE's performance does drop when the conditions get more severe, however, they remain much more stable when compared to the other policies.

Another observation we make is how FIFO seems largely unaffected in  $\mathcal{X}_Q$ . We argue this is due to FIFO being a queue based policy, effectively assigning organs to patients without any estimate of  $\hat{Y}$ . Naturally, FIFO is triumphed in performance by all estimation based policies, i.e., IS, BM, SPF, and OrganITE; though this might explain why FIFO is performing slightly better in Figure 4 given low  $\tau$ . Furthermore we notice that IS' performance is fairly close to OrganITE's performance when  $\tau$  increases, suggesting the density might matter less when the organ-density converges to a uniform density. We reason as such, as IS resembles OrganITE most closely as it too uses an ITE estimation rather than mere prediction.

# **D** Hyperparameters

Table 6: Hyperparameters ITE model and ablations							
	Padded network	Two models	Siamese network				
Layers Activation Learning rate $\gamma$ max-epochs batch-size	<ul> <li>Φ:(32, 16, 16)</li> <li>c:(16, 16, k)</li> <li>Y:(16, 16, 1)</li> </ul> ReLU <ul> <li>0.0004</li> <li>0.25</li> <li>60</li> <li>100</li> </ul>	• $\Phi^{\emptyset}$ :(16, 16, 16) • $\Phi^{\mathbf{O}}$ :(32, 16, 16) • $c$ :(16, 16, $k$ ) • $Y^{\emptyset}$ :(16, 16, 1) • $Y^{\mathbf{O}}$ :(16, 16, 1) ReLU $\emptyset$ : 0.0001; O:0.0004 0.25 60 100	<ul> <li>Φ:(16 and 32, 16, 16)</li> <li>c:(16, 16, k)</li> <li>Y<sup>∅</sup>:(16, 16, 1)</li> <li>ReLU</li> <li>0.0004</li> <li>0.25</li> <li>60</li> <li>100</li> </ul>				

Table 7: Hyperparameters multitask network

Layers	activation	learning rate	max-epochs	batch-size
(32, 16, 16, 16, 16, k)	ReLU	0.0004	60	100

Table 8:	Hyperpa	rameter	s Orga	InITE	
					1

a	b	$\alpha_1$	$\alpha_2$	KDE bandwith	KDE kernel
1	1	1	1	1	Gaussian

### E Data

Recipient		Org	gan	Cause of death	
Name	Mean (std.)	Name	Mean (std.)	Cause	Proportion
Height	168.6 (17.6)	BMI	25.8 (4.95)	Intracranial haemorrhage	57.4%
Gender	37.3% male	Gender	53.3% male	Hypoxic brain damage - all causes	13.8%
Haemoglobin	11.5 (3.8)	Cause of death	see right	Other trauma - accident	3.4%
White blood cells	5.6 (3.8)	Age	46.8 (15.99)	Intracranial - type unclassi- fied (CVA)	3.3%
Platelets	123.5 (90.5)		84.7% brain dead	Unspecified	3.1%
Serum urea	6.3 (5.6)	Donor type	13.7% circula- tory death	Trauma RTA - car	2.9%
Serum creati- nine	84.9 (43.7)		1.13% living	Intracranial thrombosis	2.1%
Serum albu- min	31.9 (6.7)		0.39% domino	Trauma RTA - pedestrian	1.8%
INR	1.4 (0.5)			Living donor	1.4%
Serum biliru- bin	87.0 (119.0)	Meningitis	1.4 %		
Serum sodium	136.2 (4.8)	Brain tumour	1.4%		
Serum potas- sium	4.2 (0.53)	Trauma RTA - motorbike	1.1%		
PO2 AFP level	12.5 (3.44) 26.0 (286.37)			Under 1% not re	eported.

Table 9: Features used in real data experiments.

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