Improved Analysis for Bandit Learning in Matching Markets

Part of Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 37 (NeurIPS 2024) Main Conference Track

Bibtex Paper Supplemental

Authors

Fang Kong, Zilong Wang, Shuai Li

Abstract

A rich line of works study the bandit learning problem in two-sided matching markets, where one side of market participants (players) are uncertain about their preferences and hope to find a stable matching during iterative matchings with the other side (arms). The state-of-the-art analysis shows that the player-optimal stable regret is of order $O(K\log T/\Delta^2)$ where $K$ is the number of arms, $T$ is the horizon and $\Delta$ is the players' minimum preference gap. However, this result may be far from the lower bound $\Omega(\max\{N\log T/\Delta^2, K\log T/\Delta\})$ since the number $K$ of arms (workers, publisher slots) may be much larger than that $N$ of players (employers in labor markets, advertisers in online advertising, respectively). In this paper, we propose a new algorithm and show that the regret can be upper bounded by $O(N^2\log T/\Delta^2 + K \log T/\Delta)$. This result removes the dependence on $K$ in the main order term and improves the state-of-the-art guarantee in common cases where $N$ is much smaller than $K$. Such an advantage is also verified in experiments. In addition, we provide a refined analysis for the existing centralized UCB algorithm and show that, under $\alpha$-condition, it achieves an improved $O(N \log T/\Delta^2 + K \log T / \Delta)$ regret.